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Abstract 
This dissertation explores the impact of American aid in the Spanish economy in the 
1950s. As opposed to much of the recent literature on the subject, it views aid as 
crucial for the Spanish economic take-off. The suggested major effect of aid was to 
rehabilitate the business sentiment, changing expectations of industrialists who were 
more willing to undertake investment projects seen as too risky before the American 
backing of Franco's regime. A game theoretical approach is presented to motivate 
the plausibility of the hypothesis, which is then confronted with the empirical 
evidence available. Anecdotal evidence such as diplomatic records is presented, 
together with data on private investment, to support the main line of reasoning. A 
further contribution of this dissertation is to consolidate what it is known (and 
highlight what is not) about the actual amounts of aid granted by the Americans . 
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Spain is run today by men of second-rate ability , men whose vIsion is 
obscured by Spain ' s glorious past. These men, in their thoughts and 
concepts , are as isolated from world thought as they are walled in physically 
by mountains and seas. Men of liberal thought and ability do not want to 
associate themselves with the Regime. [ ... ] Spain today, that is the business 
world of Spain, has no confidence in the conduct of the economy of Spain. 
Paul T .Culbertson, American charge in Spain to the Secretary of State, 
Acheson. Madrid , 20th June 1950. 1 
1. Introduction 
On 26th September 1953 Franco's Spain and the United States signed three treaties, 
covering defence, economic cooperation and technical assistance . The Pact of 
Madrid, as the agreements became to be known, committed the Americans to 
provide an unspecified amount of economic and military aid in return for the use of 
military bases, and certified the return of Spain to the international community .2 
Americans had started to grant aid to the Spanish government since the deterioration 
of the cold war in 1950, and they had similarly promoted other measures of 
international acceptance of Franco such as the return of Ambassadors to Madrid .3 
Since American aid roughly coincides with the resumption of economic growth in 
Spain in the early 1950s, the immediate question is to consider what impact did 
American aid have on the Spanish economy. 
Despite the similarities with the Marshall Plan, historiography on the impact of 
American aid in Spain has not followed the plethora of discussion about the 
I Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter FRUSj , 1950, vol.III , p.1564-6. 
2See for example Tamames, La RepUblica [titles of works in Spanish are translated into 
English in the bibliography] . In English see Preston, Franco. A recent introductory text is 
Grugel and Rees, Franco 's Spain . 
3 On the negotiations see Liedtke , Embracing a Dictatorship . For an account of the change 
in international acceptance of the regime see Ahmad , Britain, Franco Spain . 
European Recovery Programme that started in the mid-1980s. 4 No monograph 
covers the impact of American aid in the Spanish economy and much of the 
literature focuses on the diplomatic aspects, just barely touching on the economic 
impact of aid to mention the limited amounts made available as a further proof of the 
imbalance in the agreements.s However, others have given a more prominent role to 
American aid, although the transmission mechanisms suggested are generally vague, 
pointing at unspecified multiplicative effects ,6 or the relief of supply bottlenecks ,? 
with little quantitative support. 
In this dissertation we analyse some of the traditional arguments put forward and 
then move on to consider the less emphasised hypothesis that the granting of 
American aid was instrumental in changing the expectations of the Spanish business 
community. The economy in the 1940s was under too much uncertainty, and 
therefore private investment was too risky . In those circumstances waiting had a 
high value, thus encouraging the postponement of investments.8 American support 
will change that, signalling investors that the regime will both last and ultimately 
change its policies. The Pact of Madrid enhanced the credibility of the government 
and made it irrevocably committed to furthering pro-market reforms . This is not to 
say that all controls and distortionary policies were lifted at once after the signing of 
the agreement, but that private investors anticipated that the only possible move was 
towards that direction. 
4 Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, was the precursor of a literature that has 
provided quantitative answers to many questions. For example, De Long and Eichengreen, 
"The Marshall Plan". 
s Viiias, Los pactos secretos, is the classic study. 
6 Sard3, "Pr610go" . 
7 Cia vera et aI., Capitalismo espaiiol, and Garcia Delgado , "Crecimiento industrial" . 
8 This is the essence of the investment under uncertainty literature . See Dixit , 
"Investment", and Pindyck, "Irreversibility" . 
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Expectations were, therefore, crucial. Although this is no new thesis,9 the novelty 
lies in the importance attached to it and in providing a closer empirical examination 
of the claim. 
The rest of this dissertation is organised as follows . Section 2 argues for a more 
optimistic view of the growth achievements of the Spanish economy in the 1950s. 
Section 3 presents a description of the amounts, timing and form in which American 
aid was granted to Spain, followed by a discussion of possible transmission 
mechanisms through which aid could have had an impact on the domestic economy 
in section 4, including a game theoretical approach to motivate that aid could have 
had significant credibility enhancement effects. Section 5 puts the hypothesis to the 
test, presenting some anecdotal and quantitative evidence to support it. Finally, a 
conclusive section summarises the main arguments put forward and suggests areas 
for further research. 
2. Economic growth in the 19505 
Traditionally the 1950s have been portrayed as stagnant. A decade in which the 
failure of the autarkic policies was revealed yet pursued until their exhaustion and 
only abandoned at the major turning point in economic policy that 1959 represented . 
Undisputedly, the years after the 1959 Stabilisation Plan show a sustained and 
impressive growth record. However, a look at graph 1 below shows how in the 
decade of the 1950s growth experienced a significant acceleration. That growth 
spurt deserves some attention, especially since most of the literature is in fact 
providing explanations for the lack of growth of the Spanish economy. 10 
9 Spitiiller and GaJy, Spain , p.2. However, the matter is not discussed any further. 
3 
Graph 1 
Real per capita GDP, 1940-1975 
million 1980 pesetas, (log scale) 
Source: Prados, Gross Domestic Product. 
As table 1 below shows, the acceleration is particularly steep in the first half of the 
1950s. 
1941-50 
1951-60 
1961-70 
Table 1 
Real GDP annual average growth rate (%), 1941-1970 
At factor costs and market prices 
GDPfc GDPmp GDPfc GDPmp 
1941-45 1.12 1. 52 
1946-50 1. 00 0 . 96 
1. 06 1.24 1951-55 6 . 03 6 . 40 
4 . 39 4 . 71 1956-60 2.74 3.02 
8 . 34 8.13 1961-65 9.74 9.62 
1966-70 6 . 94 6.6 5 
Sources: Own calculations with data from Prados , Gross Domestic Product. Variables BVGDPFC8 and 
BVGDPMP8. 
10 The emphasis on 1959 as a watershed can be traced back to Fontana and Nadal, "Spain 
1914-1970". Other examples in English of this view can be found in Harrison, Economic 
History of Modem Spain, or, more recently, in Lieberman, Growth and Crisis , p.2. 
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Growth was even faster in the industrial sector, see table 2 below, thus suggesting 
that a structural transformation of the Spanish economy was taking place. 
Table 2 
Real industrial output annual average growth rate (%) 
Prados Carreras Prado s Carreras 
1941-45 1. 63 0. 84 
1946-50 3 .60 4.35 
1941-50 2.62 2.60 1951-55 8.02 8 .0 6 
1951-60 6.99 6.83 1956-60 5.95 5 . 59 
1961-70 12.00 1 0.92 1961-65 13 . 08 1 2.09 
1966-70 1 0 .93 9.75 
Sources: For Prados, BVPIND8 (real GDP at factor cost of manufacturing, mining and utilities in 
thousands of millions of 1980 pesetas) , in Prados, Gross Domestic Product. For Carreras, the IPIES, 
index of Spanish industrial production, in Carreras, " La produccion industrial". 
In light of the evidence presented above it seems puzzling how the stagnant view of 
the 1950s has dominated the literature to the extent that, even when growth in the 
1950s was acknowledged, it was deemed to be rather inappropriate.lI Perhaps 
growth before 1959 was simply the consequence of reconstruction, of resuming the 
full utilisation of the production capacity of the economy. 12 In fact the pre-war levels 
of most macroeconomic variables were not regained until the early 1950s, but from 
11 "The intense industrial development that indices reflect [in 1951-59] does not mean that it 
was correctly planned." Tamames, La Republica, p.437. There were, nevertheless, notable 
exceptions. Rojo emphasised that industrialisation "whether we like it or not" has taken 
place in Spain basically in the 1939-59 period. Quoted in Brafia, Buesa, and Molero, "El 
fin de la etapa nacionalista". 
t2 The claim is implicit in most authors. See Catalcin, "Reconstrucci6n", for an account of 
the Spanish reconstruction experience. 
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then on it is difficult to justify growth on a reconstruction basis, especially since the 
capital stock had surpassed the pre-war level by 1949 Y 
More widely discussed is the claim that growth in the 1950s was unsustainable given 
its inflationary nature .14 Table 3 below casts doubts on the validity of the claim that 
the Stabilisation Plan of 1959 was the unavoidable solution to an inflationary crisis . IS 
Inflation in the second half of the 1950s rises significantly yet it is still below the 
usual figures for the 1940s. More significantly , the standard deviation does not 
experience any major increase. Low variability of inflation, captured by the standard 
deviation, renders future inflation and thus profitability more predictable, which in 
turns affects positively investment and growth. 16 
Table 3 
Inflation: annual average growth rate 
and standard deviations for selected periods 
Annual average Standard 
inflation rate deviat ion 
1941 - 70 7.83 8.49 
194 1 -50 11 . 85 1 0 . 25 
1951- 50 5 .28 4 . 49 
1951 - 70 6 .3 5 2 .80 
1941-45 9 . 34 10 . 17 
1945 - 50 14. 38 9 . 44 
1951 - 55 2. 85 3 . 79 
195 5 - 50 7 . 70 4 .21 
1951-55 7 . 45 3 . 72 
1955-70 5 . 2 6 7 . 76 
Source: own calculations using data from Maluquer. "Precios" . See appendix E. 
13 Cubel and Palafox, "The capital stock" . See section 5 and appendix C below. 
14 Gonzalez, LA economia politica. 
IS This is part of the standard account of the 1959 programme. See for example Fuentes 
Quintana, "Tres decenios " . 
16 For a discussion of the importance of the link between investment and growth see 
Temple, "Equipment investment" . 
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Once again, the first half of the 1950s stands out as strikingly similar to that of the 
1960s, the usual suspect for the take-off. Overall, we can conclude that economic 
growth in the 1950s was substantially much faster than in the 1940s. It should be 
stressed that it is not a matter of rejecting the significance of the 1959 turning point, 
but emphasising an earlier one in the first half of the 1950s which coincided with the 
beginning of American aid, which we now turn to discuss . 
3. Extent of aid 
American aid over the first ten years of duration of the agreements totalled 
approximately $1,500 million .I7 However, much of this corresponded to the later 
years and figures for the earlier period are more tentative. 18 Estimates are usually 
produced for cumulative periods , which, together with the inclusion or not of all the 
numerous aid programmes, helps to explain the bewildering lack of consensus on the 
amounts of aid. Moreover, any estimate will necessarily depend on what definition 
of aid is used .19 Finally, although most aid linked to the Pact of Madrid finally 
reached the country, 20 it is important to distinguish between amounts authorised by 
the US and the goods actually received in Spain. As we will see later, time lags 
between the two were to be significant. 
17 $1,690 m according to Rubottom and Carter Murphy, Spain and the US, p.45 . Vifias, 
Los pactos, p.315, provides the figure of $1,523 m. See footnote 20 below. 
11 The best breakdown available is in Rubottom and Carter Murphy, Spain and the US, 
p.44. See also Harrison, Economic History of Modern Spain, p.133. On the qualifications 
to the figures presented see below. 
19 In what follows we consider as "aid" any public capital flow irrespective of what 
concessional element has. However, we are also interested in the evolution of private 
capital flows from American banks to the Spanish government, and we will mention all 
operations known, although these will not be included in the calculations of aid. 
20 According to figures from APG, Leg.SU2439, Exp .248, aid that reached the country 
was, however, short of the two estimates presented above, totalling $1,426 million for the 
1953-63 period. In particular, agricultural surpluses amounted to $488 m rather than the 
$572 m stated in Rubottom and Carter Murphy, Spain and the US, p.44. 
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There are four different stages at which we could look into aid. In most 
programmes, the US Congress will first earmark sums available to Spain. Specific 
purchases will then have to be authorised by the relevant agency on request of the 
Spanish government, which would subsequently grant sub-authorisations to Spanish 
importers. Finally, the goods will have to be delivered .21 Although it is precisely on 
the last stage that we are most interested in, the available data is still incomplete.22 
More often than it would have been ideal, we have had to refer to appropriated 
rather than delivered aid. 
Let us now examine the course of events during the years 1949-1955 and how aid 
came to be granted and how it evolved in the first stages .23 
The situation of Spain at the end of the 1940s did not look promising at all . Having 
been left out of the Marshall Plan, things got worse when the Argentines finally 
stopped in 1949 their shippings of wheat due to lack of payment by the Spaniards.24 
The Argentine fiasco meant the country was again, as it had been the case 
throughout the 1940s, in major balance of payments difficulties while in need of 
importing foodstuffs to avoid widespread hunger. 2.S 
21 The US agency originally in charge was the Mutual Security Agency . Its functions were 
subsequently transferred to the Foreign Operations Administration, then to the International 
Cooperation Administration and fmally to the Agency for International Development. 
22 It is important to make this distinction clearer than what it is done in the literature. It is 
often the case that a "table of imports financed with aid" turns out to provide the data on 
authorised imports, as in Viiias et al ., Politica comercial, ch.VI, table 11. 
23 For more details see Guirao, "Spain and European Economic Cooperation", ch.4. The 
most recent account of the negotiations is Liedtke, Embracing a Dictatorship. In Spanish 
see Viiias, Los pactos. 
24 The Spaniards claimed that, although the price had been fIXed in the agreement, there 
was a gentlemen's agreement by which payment would not be demanded! Guirao, "Spain 
and European Economic Cooperation", p.265. 
2S Per capita calorific intake was at the time below the (already low) 1935 level. Madrid 
saw hunger demonstrations in early 1950. Hottinger, Spain in Transition, p.15 
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Relief came on 8th February 1949, when the Chase Manhattan Bank approved a loan 
for $25 million to the official Instituto Espafiol de Moneda Extrajera 
(IEME)(Spanish Institute of Foreign Exchange) /6 and on 24th March the National 
City Bank of New York approved another loan for $20 million 27 
These dollars were certainly helpful but also short of the amounts that could be 
made available under credit programmes sponsored by Washington. The Department 
of State had indicated that Spain could apply for loans to the Export-Import Bank 
(Eximbank), although funds would only be loaned on a strictly commercial basis.28 
Applications to the Eximbank needed to be for specific projects, be presented by the 
firms concerned, and contain data justifying the means of repayment. Moreover, the 
Spanish representatives were informed that a number of factors in Spanish economic 
policy were seen as impeding the development of trade the earning of foreign 
exchange, and with them the chances of getting loans from the Eximbank. The items 
mentioned were an overvalued peseta, excessive controls over imports, the influence 
of the Instituto Nacional de Industria (INl)(National Industry Institute), and the 
restriction of 25 % on foreign ownership of firms. The Spanish officials felt these 
were "cold" banking propositions, devoid of any "warmth or cordiality" .29 
Although the doors of substantial American aid had not been unlocked yet, there 
were encouraging signs . It was in the month of February 1950 that the first official 
US assistance was granted to Spain. The Americans sold 86 million pounds of 
26 FRUS, 1949, vol.IV, Culbertson to Acheson, Madrid, 171l! February, p.729. The Chase 
Manhattan required gold as collateral for this operation. According to ChamoITo and 
Fontes, Los bases, p,42, this loan was extended in $5 m on 1" January 1950, and the same 
bank granted another loan for $12 m on 141l! January 1950. 
r7 Rubottom and Carter Murphy, Spain and the US, p.19. 
28 FRUS, 1949, vol.IV, Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr William B.Dunham of the 
Office of West em Affairs, Washington, I" November, p.763 . 
29 Ibid., p.764-5 . 
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potatoes to the Spanish government, which was able to end the rationing of potatoes 
that had lasted since the Civil War. 30 
The exacerbation of the Cold War was to be crucial to open wide the door to aid. 
The US government, not so long ago "definitely" not in favour of the extension of a 
general balance of payments loan to Spain,31 was now willing to give such assistance 
to incorporate her into the defence system of the West. 32 On 28th August 1950, a few 
weeks after the outbreak of the war in Korea, the US Congress earmarked $62.5 
million of the Mutual Security Act to be loaned to Spain by the Eximbank. 
The Spaniards for once proceeded according to the Eximbank ' s requirements, 
submitting in early 1951 the required recovery plan to qualify for the loan.33 They 
were, however, slow in presenting specific projects and the bank complained about 
the Spanish refusal to take seriously the bank ' s policies . By April 1951 only five 
credits totalling $17.2 million had been authorised by the Eximbank.34 Even more 
puzzling was the Spanish unwillingness to actually exercise some of the approved 
credits, as in the case of the $3 million allocated to purchase tractors and parts . 35 
Yet, the American military were determined to go ahead with their new policy 
towards Spain, and missions were sent in the summer of 1951 to Spain to analyse 
30 Rubottom and Carter Murphy, Spain and the US, p.19. 
31 FRUS, 1950, vol.ID, Acheson to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations (Connally), Washington, 18'" January, p.1554. 
32 FRUS, 1951, vol.IV, Statement of Policy by the National Security Council, Washington, 
1st February , p.790. 
33 Rubottom and Carter Murphy, Spain and the US, p.20. 
34 $5 m for cotton, $5 m for wheat, $3 .5 m for fertilizers , $3 m for tractors and parts, and 
$0.7 m for a fertilizer factory project by Sociedad Iberica Nitr6geno. Guirao, "Spain and 
European Economic Cooperation", pp.284-8. 
3l FRUS, 1951, vol.IV, The Chairman of the Export-Import Bank (Gaston) to the Embassy 
in Spain, Washington, 23rd April, pp.845-6. Even the always pro-Spanish Ambassador 
Griffis acknowledged that the Spaniards were not taking full advantage of what was at their 
disposal. FRUS, 1951, vol.IV, Griffis to Acheson, Madrid, 8'" December, pp.855-6. 
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her military potential and her economic situation. While awaiting the reports of 
these missions the American government authorised, in September 1951, further 
assistance in the form of a wheat sale under the Commodity Credit Corporation 
(CCC) for a value of $20 million to be paid in pesetas at a exchange rate of 42.50 
pesetas/dollar.36 
A far-reaching agreement appeared to be imminentY However, it would take two 
more years to be finalised . The negotiations were delayed for a number of reasons . 
Firstly, the US Secretary of State, Acheson, had to set up a new negotiating team 
following the death of Admiral Sherman just six days after his meeting with Franco 
in July 1951. Moreover, Truman had reluctantly accepted the change in policy 
towards Spain,38 and kept expressing his personal dislike of the Caudillo.39 In 
addition, in 1951 there were also Presidential elections in the US . Despite the 
inauguration of the Eisenhower administration, the negotiations did not speed up. 
The Spanish focus on signing a Concordat with the Vatican40 and her unrealistic 
approach to the bargaining4! contributed also to the delay . 
36 Banco Hispano Americano, La situacion economica en 1956, p.3!. 
31 See The Economist, 21" July 1951 , p.I44 . 
38 Time, 4'" September 1950 reported that "Congress was bent on compelling President 
Truman to lend money against his will to Franco". 
39 For example, at press conference on 7'" February 1952. Preston, Franco, p.617. When 
Acheson recalls, in his memoirs, of the many deep-seated opinions of Truman he gives 
precisely the example of Truman ' s views on Franco. Acheson, Present at the Creation , 
p.169. 
40 Rubottom and Carter Murphy, Spain and the US, p.24. 
4\ Franco for long believed the Americans would pay any price he would ask. When he 
realised this was not the case he instructed his negotiators that "in the last resort, if you 
don 't get what you want, sign anything that they put in front of you. We need that 
agreement" . Quoted in Preston, Franco, p. 623 . 
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In the meanwhile more funds had been earmarked under the Mutual Security Act ,42 
and the Eximbank granted, outside the $62.5 m line of credit, two loans to purchase 
cotton for $12 million in January 1952 and again for the same amount in April 
1953.43 
The treaties fmally signed in September 1953 envisaged aid in two forms , military 
and economic or "defense support". Military aid in the form of end items amounted 
to $407 million up to fiscal year 1959, with actual deliveries being $315 rnillion .44 
However, these estimates value second-hand equipment at acquisition cost and thus 
overstate the actual amount received.45 Moreover, it is not unreasonable to think that 
a large share of these military items would not have been bought by Spain had she 
had to pay for them. For these reasons we will exclude military aid in our account. 
With regard to "defense support" , every year the US Congress would vote a Mutual 
Security Act (MSA) including appropriations for individual countries . The amounts 
appropriated for Spain are detailed in table 4 below. 
42 $100 ID on 31" October 1951 and $25 ID on 20<1> June 1952. Guirao, "Spain and European 
Economic Cooperation", ehA. 
43 Guirao, "Spain and European Economic Cooperation", table 4.1. 
44 Whitaker, Spain and De/ense, p.240. The reference quoted is US Department of 
Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, The 
Military Assistance Program: Programs and Deliveries !Jy Area and Country, Fiscal Years 
1950-1960, release of February 26, 1960. 
45 Whitaker, Spain and De/ense, p.240. 
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Table 4 
Amount of aid appropriated in concept of 
"defense support" (economic aid) . In thousands US dollars. 
1953-54 1 954-55 1955 -56 1 956-57 1957-58 1 958-59 
Agric . products 15,000 55,000· 27,000 18,500 22,784 18 , 000 
Raw materials 15,000 7,690 4 ,600 35,500 27,366 23,619 
Machinery 54,392 21,510 26,400 15,000 4,850 8,381 
Technical 
assistance 607 800 2,000 1,000 1,304 1 , 239 
Total 8 5,000 85,000 60,000 70,000 56, 304 51,239 
*: The original proposal for $30 m was modified by the adoption of an amendment presented by 
Senator McCarran, a distinguished member of the "Spanish lobby" in Washington. The extra $55 m 
were specifically earmarked to facil itate Spanish purchases of American agricultural surpluses . 
Source : Rovira, " La ayuda" , p.139. 
The sale of wheat under the CCC and the McCarran amendment were not going to 
be the only means through which American agricultural surpluses were shipped to 
Spain. In the following years, Public Law 480 would be extensively used to provide 
for this type of sale, which contributed not only to alleviate the situation in Spain but 
also to provide foreign markets for the American farmer. A summary of aid granted 
to Spain in this form is provided in table 5 below. 
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Table 5 
Aid in form of agricultural surpluses 
FY1951 FY1952 FY1953 FY1954 FY1955 FY1956 FY1957 FY1958 FY1959 
CCC 20.0 
McCarran 
55.0 
PL480 
47.1 71. 8 66 . 8 Ill. 6 96.4 
Total - - - 20.0 102 .1 7 1. 8 66.8 111. 6 96.4 
Source: Banco Urquijo, La economla espaitola, 1961 . 
Agricultural surpluses such as powder milk and other dairy products were also 
shipped to Spain as grants by the National Catholic Welfare Conference which were 
distributed in Spain by Caritas . Although this social assistance constituted a private 
donation, its institutional nature and large dimension prompt us to include it in our 
calculations of aid. Table 6 below shows the amounts granted under this scheme. 
Table 6 
Social assistance by the National Catholic Welfare Conference 
in million dollars, calendar years 
1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 
5 22 31 35 25.6 10.8 
Source: Banco Urquijo, La economfa espaitola, 1961 . Chamorro et al ., "Las balanzas", provides 
different figures : $9.6 ID in 1954, $9.3 ID in 1955, $25 .6 ID in 1956, $29.4 ID in 1957, and $25.4 ID 
in 1958. 
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The US was also going to provide further aid to Spain through the Eximbank, 
involving now the bank's own funds and not limited to a special provision under the 
MSA, as it had been the case with the $62.5 million line of credit granted in 1950. 
Starting in July 1954 this second phase of Eximbank loans involved $55.5 million up 
to fiscal year 1959.46 These funds were lent to enterprises on a commercial basis and 
for specific projects , of which construction of electric plants was paramount. 47 Table 
7 below summarises the activities of the Eximbank in relation to Spain. 
FY1951 
$62.5m' 17.2 
Cottonb 
2nd phasec 
Total 17.2 
(Vinas)d 
Table 7 
Eximbank loans authorised by fiscal year 
in million dollars 
FY1952 FY1953 FY1954 FY1955 FY1956 FY1951 FY1958 
11.5 13.6 10.9 3.3 
12.0 12 .0 
1.2 8.5 ? 8 . 9 
23.5 25 . 6 10 . 9 5.5 8.5 8.9 
148.11 110.91 13.31 19.81 14.31 
FY1959 
29.5 
29 . 5 
18 .01 
46 First loan to Compaiiia Electrica de Langreo for $1 ,250,000 to build a coal-fired power 
station. On 7 July 1955 the second loan was given, for $8m again to an electricity 
company, Hidroelectrica Espaiiola. A total $45.5 m went to power stations. Rovira, "La 
ayuda", p.50. 
47 FeIlllindez de Valderrama, " Espafia-USA ", p.50, gives dates for several (although not 
all) loans to specific companies: RENFE ($8m, 3-12-57), Iberduero ($9.5m, 18-9-58), 
Enesa ($15 .6m, 11-12-58), Ensidesa ($4.4m, 18-5-59). 
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Sources and notes; 
' ; For FYI951 FRUS 1951, vol.IV, pp.845-6; then Guirao, "Spain and European Economic 
Cooperation". These only add to 56.5 m. 
Harrison, An EcolUlmic History of Modern Spain, p.133 , quotes very different figures ; 30.7 m for 
calendar year 1952 and 18.7 m for 1953. These cannot be right if we compare it with the data 
provided by the Embassy in Washington, stating that up to 31" December 1953, disboursements on 
the $62.5 m loan programme amounted to $42.9 m. Letter from Ambassador Areilza to Minister 
Arbunla, Washington, 19'" April 1954. MAE, Leg.5289, Exp. !. 
According to Rovira, "La ayuda", p.148, the funds were assigned to projects as follows: raw 
materials 15.8 m, transport 9.7 m, mining 9.8 m, agriculture 9.3 m, foodstuffs 7.2 m, electricity 6.8 
m, steel industry 3.8 m. Note that this adds up to 62.4 m. 
For details of all beneficiaries of this line of credit see VUlar , "El capital publico exterior", p.543. 
'; Guirao, "Spain and European Economic Cooperation" . Most sources simply do nOI refer to these 
two loans, notably Rovira, "La ayuda" . Unfortunately we have no record of when were these loans 
exercised or when did the cotton arrive . 
'; Rovira, "La ayuda" , provides details for all loans in FYl955 and FY1956. Ferruindez de 
Valderrama, " Espaiia-USA ", p.50, provides details for loans in FYI958 and FY1959. 
?: Although Rovira, "La ayuda" , or Ferruindez de Valderrama, " Espaiia-USA " , do not provide 
details of loans for this year it seems unlikely that no funds were loaned . 
d; Vifias et al., Polflica comercial, provides aggregated values for the total . Rubottom and Carter 
Murphy, Spain and the US, replicates Vifias ' figures . Note how inconsistent our findings are with 
those figures . Compare this with "by May [19511 Spain had received $52.5 m out of the total $62.5 
m", Liedtke, Embracing a Dictatorship, p.103 . These disparities highlight how little is still known 
about the Eximbank loans to Spain. 
Defense support aid generated a counterpart fund in pesetas. The Spanish 
government was required to pay in pesetas the equivalent value of dollars received, 
using for that purpose a specified exchange rate of 35 pesetas per dollar. 48 During 
the first five years, 60% of counterpart funds of defense support was for base 
construction, and a further 10% was for US government expenses in Spain. The 
remaining 30% would be allocated for development projects . Agricultural surpluses 
sold under PLA80 also involved counterpart funds, 50% of which were for 
development programmes.49 Although counterpart funds are not real aid, as it is the 
48 From 1958 onwards 90% of defense support counterpart funds was made available for 
development projects. Tarnames, La RepUblica, p.222. The exchange rate was increased to 
42 ptas/dollar on April 1957 and to 60 ptas/dollar on July 1959. Fernandez de Valderrama, 
" Espaiia-USA ", p.24. 
49 The McCarran amendment had its own terms: $20 m being a loan, $24 m a grant and the 
remaining $11 m giving rise to counterpart funds, computed at 38.95 ptas/dollar and 
available for the US government expenses in Spain. PLA80 sales were computed at 38.95 
ptas/dollar. Baldrich, "Balance", p.37. 
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Spanish government that puts these pesetas at the disposal of Americans , it could be 
argued that the Americans might have pushed for projects with these funds, in a way 
deciding the structure of Spanish public expenditure. The fact is that apart from the 
construction of bases little was done, especially in the earlier period . The Spanish 
government deposited a total of 5,046 million pesetas over 1954 and 1955, while 
disbursements amounted only to 935 million pesetas .50 Even base construction 
proceeded slowly and with relatively little participation of Spanish businesses.51 
Let us now summarise aid, as authorised, in tables 8 and 9 . 
FY19S1 
Eximbank 17.2 
Defense 
suppo rt 
Agric. 
Surpluses 
Sociala 
Tot al C 17 .2 
N01es : 
Table 8 
Summary of non-military aid authorised 
in million dollars 
FY1952 FY1953 FY1954 FY1955 FY1956 FY1957 
23 . 5 25 .6 10 . 9 4 . 5 ? 8 .0 ? 15 .5 
B5.0 30.0 60 . 0 70 .0 
20 . 0 102 . 1 71.8 66. B 
5 . 0 22.0 31.0 35 .0 
23.5 25 . 6 120 . 9 158.6 170.8 187.3 
FY19Sa 
8 .0 
56 . 1 
Ill. 6 
25.6 
201.3 
? refers to the qualifications on Eximbanlc loans as detailed in table 7 above 
• Social assistance corresponds to calendar year 
50 Banco Urquijo, La economia espanola 1954-1955. 
FY1959 
29 .5 
51.2 
96.4 
10 .8 
202 Bb 
51 In September 1954 the Americans invited tenders for 30,000 tonnes of cement. No 
Spanish fmu bid, despite Spain's annual production of almost 3 million tonnes. The 
Economist, 30" October 1954, p.396. 
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' Includes the loan agreed on 5" June 1959 to RENFE for $14.9 m under the Development Loan 
Fund. Fernandez de Valderrama, "Espaiia-USA", p.51. 
' Note that these values are very different to the "non-military net grants, credits and other 
assistance" as quoted by Rubbotom and Caner Murphy, Spain and the US, p.46, from the US 
Department of Commerce, Foreign Grants and Credits by the United States , Fiscal Year Reports 
1957-1%3. The figures quoted there are as follows: FYI951 /5 140 m; FYI956 117 m; FYI957 135 
m; FYI958 78 m; FYI959 118 m. Unfortunately, since they do not provide disaggregated data, we 
do not know which programmes it is supposed to include or if it is aid committed or actually 
delivered. 
Sources: as detailed in tables 5, 6, and 7 above. 
Table 9 
Economic classification of aid authorised 
in million dollars 
FY1951 FY1952 FY1953 FY1954 FY1955 FY1956 FY195 7 FY1958 
Foodstuffs 5 . 0 40 .0 22 . 0 58.0 
Raw 
materials 5.0 12.0 12 .0 15 . 0 109 . 8 76.4 
Capital 
goods a 7 . 2 11 .5 13 .6 65 .9 26 .8 36.4 
Total 1 7 . 2 2 3 . 5 25 . 6 120 . 9 158 .6 170 . 8 
Notes: 
• includes, intermediate goods, plant equipment, and technical 
assistance 
Sources: as detailed in tables 5, 6, and 7 above. 
53.5 48 . 3 
102.3 138.9 
31.5 14.1 
187 .3 201. 3 
FY1959 
28. 8 
120 . 0 
39. 1 
187.9 
Yet these tables show aid as authorised, not actual deliveries of goods . As it was 
clear with the case of the Eximbank loans, aid was not taken up quickly . Although it 
has not been possible to provide an annual breakdown of aid received in the same 
form as with aid appropriated as done above, we have been able to calculate the 
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actual amounts received at a particular point in time, 31 SI March 1956. The details 
are presented in table 10 below. 
Defense 
McCarran 
PL480 
Total 
Table 10 
American aid received by 31 SI March 1956 
in million dollars 
Authorised by lCA Received 
support 
From FY1954 
84.4 
From FY1955 29.9 
From FY1956 27.0 
54.3 
49 .6 
245.2 
Source: MAE, Leg.4615, Exp. 15. 
46.8 
9.7 
1.2 
53.8 
32.6 
144 .1 
A bener date for calculations would be 30" June , so as to cover entire fiscal years. For aid received 
by 30" June 1957 we have the Subsecretaria de Economia Exterior, Direcci6n General de 
Cooperaci6n Econ6mica, Infonne sobre el desarrollo de la Ayuda economica, no . 13. The amount 
received was $216.9 m. However, this does not provide disaggregate figures for programmes but 
rather by individual authorisations granted by the lCA. Unfortunately we have not found these 
reports for the 30" June of previous years. A selection of these reports can be found in MAE, 
Leg .6287, Exp.2. 
However, the table above does not include social assistance or Eximbank loans. If 
we include these, we arrive at an approximate figure of $270 million received in the 
six years 1950-1955.52 The figure is tentative, and the main purpose of the table 
presented is to highlight the lags in delivering aid. This was especially the case when 
52 We assume that $35 ID of social assistance and $91 .2 m of Eximbank loans were 
delivered, as discussed in tables 6 and 7 above . 
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aid involved goods other than agricultural surpluses as shown by the fact that 
McCarran and PL480 aid are delivered much faster than defense support. 
We have also calculated the amounts of cotton and capital goods that were received 
by 31st March 1956. Cotton was the single largest item on which aid was spent, 
while information on capital goods is valuable given their economic importance. 
With regard to cotton, by 31st March 1956 Spain had received a total of $14.3 
million from defense support aid FY1954, $47.8 million from the McCarran 
amendment, and $7 .3 million corresponding to defense support aid from FY1956. If 
we include the $5 million from the $62 .5 million line of credit and the $24 million 
Eximbank loan spent in cotton,53 we arrive at a figure of approximately $93 million 
received in cotton up to 31 st March 1956.54 With regard to machinery and plant 
equipment, by 31 st March 1956 Spain had received $21.5 million. If we add the 
loans from the Eximbank spent in capital goods over these years the figure is 
approximately $60.3 million.55 
It is clear that we do not even have a complete picture for a particular point in time, 
let alone a record of how was aid being delivered throughout the entire 1950s. 
Access to the Eximbank loans folders in the Historical Archive of the Bank of 
Spain, Eximbank annual reports, and further research at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in Madrid will most probably be highly productive in completing the picture 
presented here. 
53 As discussed in table 7 above. 
54 $152.3 m received by 30'" June 1957. MAE, Leg.6287, Exp.2. 
55 MAE, Leg .4615 , Exp.15. Upper bound estimate of Eximbanlc loans spent in capital 
goods of $38.8 m as discussed in table 7 above. 
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According to what Camilo [Alonso Vega] has told me, the best thing that the 
Americans did for us was empty the Madrid bars and cabarets of whores, 
since they almost all marry American sergeants and GIs. 
Franco in private. Quoted in Preston, Franco, p.627 . 
4. Did aid matter? Possible transmission mechanisms 
Certain accounts of the American assistance programme suggest that the relatively 
modest amount of aid had little economic impact. 56 In fact, the Spanish government 
felt betrayed by the scarcity of American aid,57 which was being short of 
expectations. 58 
However, the vast majority of the literature, although acknowledging the 
unimpressive dimension of the aid programme, asserts that it had a significant 
impact in the Spanish economy. 59 Explanations can be said to fall under two 
categories, the "relief of bottlenecks", and the "political economy" argument. 
The first one states that aid was crucial in allowing the import of goods without 
which the whole economy would have struggled . Lack of foreign exchange was seen 
56 Viiias, Los pactos, Tamames, La RepUblica. By the end of the 1950s the Spanish press 
was extremely critical of the US for the "insufficient" funds made available . See for 
example Ya , 6'" February 1958. 
57 Internal communications within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs often refer to the low 
level of aid. See the correspondence between the Embassy in Washington and the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs in Madrid in MAE, Leg.4615, Exp.15. 
58 According to Lowi, "US Bases", the US committed themselves to provide $226 m. A 
letter from Ambassador Dunn two days before the signing of the treaties stated that "I am 
authorised to inform His Excellency that my Government has the intention of supplying, in 
total, the amount of 465 million dolIars, depending on the appropriations by Congress, 
through the period of four years". MAE, Leg.4615 , Exp .15 . 
59 Garcia Delgado, "Crecimiento industrial", Clavera et aI., Capitaiismo espanoi. 
However, little (if any) quantitative evidence is provided. Diaz Berenguer, "La ayuda", is 
another optimistic account. 
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as the most important bottleneck in the Spanish economy in the 1950s,60 and thus 
one would expect that the aid-dollars provided a much needed relief.61 It has also 
been suggested that the failure to import raw materials and fuels was the key to the 
Spanish under-performance with respect to Italy.62 The second line of argument 
emphasises the positive impact of lifting barriers to trade and free industry, such as 
the removal of price controls, on the levels of economic activity . 63 
When combined, the two arguments are what one can call the traditional 
interpretation that "industrial growth in 1951-56 was mainly due to increase in 
imports and relaxation of interventionist policies". 64 American aid, the argument 
follows, was crucial in both.65 Let us examine first the argument about imports, and 
then the political economy one. 
4.1 Alleviation of bottlenecks and shortages 
Aid disbursed, as discussed above, totalled approximately $270 over the period 
1950-1955. This represents 8.2% of the value of Spanish imports for that period.66 
The comparison of the aid to imports ratio with other American support programmes 
is striking. For example, between 1953 and 1962 American aid financed nearly 70% 
of Korean importS!67 Even when compared with Marshall Plan aid, Spain fares 
worse. 68 
60 As emphasised in the editorials of Info17TUlci6n Comercial Espailola . See for example: 
"El sector exterior", no.333, May 1961, p.15 . 
61 This is the main impact of aid suggested in Shearer, "Significado". 
62 Catalan, "Reconstruccion", p.377-8. 
6J Anderson, The Political Economy. 
64 Clavera et aI., Capitalismo espailol, p.257. 
6S Ibid. Also in Harrison, An Economic History of Modem Spain , p.154. 
66 Own calculations with data on imports from Chamorro et al ., "Las balanzas" . The figure 
is 8.3 % if we use data from United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics. 
67 Haggard, Pathways, p.55 . 
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Furthermore, if we concentrate on the four years 1950-1953, American aid only 
amounted to $66.3 million or 2.4% of imports . Yet, as shown in graph 1 above, the 
economy was growing in 1950-1953 at a very fast pace. Moreover, for the years 
1954 and 1955 we have $196 million of total aid disbursed (representing over 17% 
of imports), yet economic growth does not suffer a sudden acceleration. There is a 
timing problem. If relieving bottlenecks of imports was the crucial influence of aid, 
one would expect not to see such a fast growth in 1950-53, and faster growth in 
1954-55. Moreover, despite the disbursement of aid in 1954-55, imports in real 
terms in those years did not grow in fact (see graph 2 below) and were still below 
the 1935 level. 69 
Graph 2 
Imports, 1948-1959 
in 1913 million pesetas 
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Source: own elaboration with data from Tena, "Comercio exterior". 
Nevertheless, it has be argued that the bottleneck explanation works better with 
reference to particular industries and/or goods: 
68 ERP aid to Germany in 1947-9 provided for the majority of imports . Berger and Ritschl, 
"Germany and the political economy", p.205. 
69 In 1953 imports reached 87.2% of the 1935 level, then stabilizing at 85.1 % and 85 .3% . 
The 1935 level was only regained in 1960. Own calculations with data from Tena, 
"Comercio exterior" . 
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Given the wide range of bottlenecks in the Spanish economy, an increase in 
imports, although of not large absolute figures , would have immediate 
effects , provided imports were directed to those sectors where domestic 
supplies were more limited.'o 
However, the literature simply stops there. Unfortunately, the most detailed and 
quantitative analysis of Spanish industry at the time focuses on non-leading sectors , 
and does not provide estimates of the quantitative relevance of the bottlenecks.'1 To 
complement the aggregate exposition above we have focused on capital goods , 
fertilizers , and cotton, all goods that enter in the production function and that might 
be thought of as being the most effective use of aid-dollars . 
The cotton textile industry was working below its capacity because of shortages of 
both cotton and electricity, 72 and certainly the imports of cotton due to American aid 
help this considerably large part of the Spanish economy. Cotton, including the 
amounts consumed directly and those used as inputs in other industries, contributed 
2.8% to Spain's GNP in 1955 .73 As discussed above, approximately $93 million 
worth of imported cotton was paid with American aid by 31 st March 1956. By 30m 
June 1957 a further $82 million had been received . 
Graph 3 below shows the evolution of cotton imports during the period . 
10 Clavera et al., Capitalismo espaiiol, p.254. However, neither this source, nor Garcia 
Delgado, "Crecimiento industrial" , suggest specific commodities to test their hypothesis 
on. 
71 Catahin, "Industrializaci60 difusa". 
72 For an impact of electricity shortages see Sudriii, "Un factor", pp.334-5. 
13 Calculations based 00 the Input-Output table for 1955. Instituto de Estudios Politicos, 
Tablas input-output. 
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Graph 3 
Imports of cotton, 1947-1959 
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Source: own elaboration with data from United Nations, Yearbook of inteT7UltioTUlI Trade 
Statistics. various years. 
American aid was fInancing an increasing share of cotton imports, but the total level 
of cotton imports was not showing any trend to increase. Given that electricity 
shortages were also much lightened by the mid-fIfties,74 this casts doubts as to 
whether the cotton textile industry was really, as the industrialists claimed, working 
at 20 % of its potential. 75 
Although important, the import of raw materials was seen as a second-best option, 
since Spanish officials recognised that American aid was an opportunity to fInance 
large imports of equipment and machinery . In fact , in 1957, $7 million of 
agricultural surpluses from PL480 were acrually shipped to Austria and Switzerland, 
so Spain could import manufactured goods from those countries. 76 Even before any 
agreement under PL480 had been signed, the Spanish Commercial attache in 
Washington had referred to the "little or zero value of the new agricultural surpluses 
74 Castafieda and Redonet, "Incidencia". 
75 Sufrin, "The Outlook in Spain", provides the figure . 
76 Rubottom and Carter Murphy, Spain and the US, p.44. 
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programmes offered» , 77 However, this contrasts with the fact that the Spanish 
government would continue to ask from time to time for exceptional sales of 
wheat. 78 
Let us now consider an intermediate good, such as fertilizers . Graph 4 shows 
imports of fertilizers over the period that we are interested in. 
Graph 4 
Imports of fertilizers , 1947-1959 
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Source: United Nations , Yearbook oJ Incernational Trade Suuistics , various years. 
Although imports of fertilizers show an upward trend, American aid was not used at 
all to finance these purchases,79 Agriculture was in fact the sector less favoured by 
77 Mr Gimenez-Arnau, as quoted in a letter from Ambassador Areilza to Minister Arbunia, 
Washington, 31" December 1954. MAE, Leg.4615 , Exp .15 . 
78 As late as 1" July 1957 Spain asked for an extra delivery of $20 m in wheat. MAE, 
Leg.6287, Exp. l. Similarly, as shown above, the loans from the Eximbank were not being 
fully taken up. 
79 MAE, Leg .6287, Exp.2. 
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aid-dollars, receiving in total $13 .2 million up to 30th June 1957 .80 This figure 
suggests that the direct impact of American aid in the agrarian sector was extremely 
limited. 
Let us now consider the imports of capital goods. That American assistance allowed 
Spain to import machinery and equipment has been emphasised in the literature as 
one of the most important contributions of the aid programme.81 As discussed above, 
imports of machinery and capital equipment paid with American aid amounted to 
$60.3 million by 31 SI March 1956, and mainly concentrated over three years. The 
approximate annual average of $20 million represents less than half of the annual 
average of the (very low) capital goods imports during the purely autarkical years.82 
This figure compares even worse with those of capital imports for the period: 
$152.4 million in 1953, $154.5 million in 1954, and $196.4 million in 1955.83 If we 
also consider that these capital goods were incorporated in projects with a certain 
maturing period until they would start producing,84 it seems unlikely that the import 
of capital goods paid with American aid had a crucial impact on Spanish economic 
growth in the 1950s . 
Nevertheless, there was a significant change in the structure of imports. Although 
total imports did not increase, those of capital goods (and thus their share in total 
imports) did so substantially . 85 See graph 5 below on capital goods imports . 
80 This includes tractors, agricultural machinery , equipment for the Ministry of Agriculture 
and seeds. MAE, Leg.6287, Exp.2. 
81 For an extremely optimistic view see Rubottom and Carter Murphy, Spain and the US, 
p.2l. 
82 Annual average for 1945-49 was $44.6m. Calculated with data on imports of capital 
goods from Gonzalez, La economia politica. 
83 Gonzalez, La economia politica. 
84 For example $4m from FY1954 were assigned to ENSIDESA, the steel project of 1Nl. 
MAE, Leg.4615, Exp.15. This steel project was not expected to start production until 
1958, Clinton Pelham, Economic and Commercial Conditions. 
ss Gonz3Jez, La economiapolitica, p.l03. 
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Graph 5 
Imports of machinery and transport equipment 
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Source: United Nations , Yearbook of International Trade Sralistics, various years . 
This was, however, the reflection of the on-going import-substitution 
industrialisation strategy . 86 The adoption in December 1948 of a multiple exchange 
rate regime favouring capital over consumption goods imports,87 and the impact of 
the devaluation, which followed the European ones in 1949, seem to be more 
important than the granting of American aid in explaining Spanish foreign trade. 88 
The real depreciation of the peseta in the early 1950s89 explains not only the 
improved export performance in those years but also the sudden rise in imports in 
1950-52 since, given the lack of foreign credit, imports were constrained by foreign 
exchange earned through exports . 
Overall, although imports financed with American aid were certainly a positive 
contribution, they cannot fully account for the spurt of growth in the Spanish 
86 Donges, "From an Autarkic" . 
g) Tamames, Estructura EconOmica de Espafia . 
88 Serrano and Asensio, "El ingenierismo cambiario". 
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economy. Professor Sufrin, head of American economic mission to Spain in 1951, 
estimated that with aid in the order of $130 million the first year and $195 million 
over a period of four years, Spanish industrial output could be growing at 6-8% p.a. 
while agricultural output could expand at 12-20% p.a. 90 Wheat output grew at 
annual rates above 20% ,91 and industry too experienced the sudden growth that we 
have seen in table 2 above . But these were achieved already in the 1951-53 period in 
which aid authorised (let alone disbursed) added up to less than $70 m for the three 
years as a whole! 
4.2 Political economy links 
The second part of the traditional argument suggests that economic growth resumed 
as the restrictions that swept the economy were lifted. The Americans demanded 
Spain to commit herself to openness to international trade and internal liberalisation, 
and, to the extent that these lead to economic growth, the latter could be seen as a 
by-product of the aid programme. 
Observers were quick to suggest that the deal with the Americans would translate in 
a better management of the Spanish economy.92 However, this should not be 
overemphasised. Americans pressed for deregulation and openness not only because 
of their free-trade . convictions, but more importantly because of the need to 
guarantee a stable environment that would not disrupt their use of the military bases . 
Aid was merely a quid pro quo for the use of the bases . The Americans were aiming 
at minimising their grants and involvement provided they were just enough "to 
insure internal stability in Spain so that the use of our bases there would not be 
89 See appendix F. 
90 Sufrin was not in favour of a large aid package that he thought the Spanish economy 
could not "digest". Sufrin, "Outlook in Spain", p.7 . 
91 Barciela, "Crecimiento y cambio", p.266. 
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jeopardized by civil disorders". 93 This explains the continuous concern about 
inflation in Spain by the American authorities, and their insistence in delivering 
consumption goods so that inflationary pressures were kept down.94 Provided there 
was stability, the Americans will not twist Franco ' s arm to make him comply with 
the economic ideology signed in the Pact of Madrid.9S 
How effective were these pressures is an irresolvable issue. The relative success of 
Spanish policy-makers in the anti-inflationary front has already been noted in section 
2 above. Although it is difficult to precise the effect of the American pressures, 
there is evidence that the Spanish government took this point on board when pointed 
out by the Americans.96 
However, little else apart from the fight against inflation was accomplished. During 
the following years Americans insisted in their complaints on the restrictions to 
foreign direct investment, never getting the expected response from the Spanish 
govemment.97 The recurrent voicing of American concerns about what Spanish 
diplomatic sources referred to as "the usual topics of freeing foreign investment and 
92 "If Americans intend to see that any aid given is efficiently and honestly used, then it is 
probable that some change in the corrupt and tyrannical habits of the Franco regime will 
follow" . The Economist, 21" July 1951, p .145. 
93 This was also the personal view of President Eisenhower. FRUS, 1955-1957, XXVII, 
Memorandum of Discussion at the 24Sth Meeting of the National Security Council , 
Washington, 12th May 1955, p.539. 
94 For the emphasis on inflation see Sause, "Algunos aspectos". 
9S "Will the government of the US be willing to channel aid in the most favourable way for 
Spain? We doubt it", Fuentes Quintana and Plaza Prieto, "Perspectivas", p.112. 
96 Letter from Ambassador Lodge to Minister Martin Artajo, Madrid, 23011 November 1956, 
asks for more anti-inflationary measures. Minister Martin Artajo replies to the American 
Embassy on 7th January 1957 with the promise of interest rates hikes and public expenditure 
cuts. 
Balfour, Dictatorship, p.23 , states that the rise in tram fares in Barcelona in 1951 (which 
gave rise to a general strike) was the result of American pressure to contain private 
demand. 
97 MAE, Leg .7741 , Exp.3. Letter from Ambassador Lodge to Minister Martin Artajo, 
Madrid, 23011 November 1956. 
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remittances "98 could be interpreted as a sign of a failure to imbue the economic 
orthodoxy in the Spanish policy-making. 
Nevertheless, some Spanish policy-makers did wholeheartedly convert to economic 
liberalism. The government that resulted from the reshuffle of 18th July 195199 
proved to be surprisingly pro-liberal in economic ideology. 100 Cavestany, appointed 
Minister of Agriculrure, had been himself an agriculrural entrepreneur, while the 
new Minister of Commerce Arburua was an international banker . They were both 
believers of the role of free prices and did express so accordingly . 101 
Some liberalisation did occur. The most visible was the end of rationing . The rest of 
the alleged liberalisation was the progressive elimination of the discretionary system 
of import licences and the introduction of a general tariff, which was nevertheless 
extremely protective. I02 The change was marked in the attitudes of certain policy-
makers . Foreign Affairs Minister Martin Artajo concluded that the most important 
element of the deal was its spirit, summarised in the need for a healthy economy 
based on monetary and budgetary discipline. t03 In fact , in the treaty itself signed on 
26th September 1953 Spain committed itself: 
(b) To stabilize its currency , establish or maintain a valid rate of exchange, 
balance its governmental budget as soon as practicable, create or maintain internal 
fmancial stability [ ... ] 
98 MAE, Leg.4615 , Exp.15 , Letter from Ambassador Areilza to Minister Arburua, 
Washington, 31" December 1954. 
99 This reshuffle has been interpreted as a gesture towards the Americans . Esteban, 
"Economic Policy of Francoism", pp.93-4. 
lOO The Economist, 28'" July 1951 , pp.232-3 , in an article titled "No Change in Madrid" 
qualified the appointment of Cavestany as Minister of Agriculture as "routine promotion" 
I and doubted whether Arburua would be able to make any difference. By 25'" August, The 
Economist, p.433, was praising the "patent and laudable desire to do away with some of 
the onerous controls over production". 
101 For a taste of Arburua 's free-market endorsement see his article in Arriba, 25'" February 
1950. Details of ministers in Equipo Mundo, Los 90 Ministros. 
102 Spitiiller and Galy, Spain , p.5f. 
lOO Speech by Minister of Foreign Affairs Martin Artajo to the Cortes on 30'" November 
1953. MAE, Leg.7741, Exp.2. 
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(e)To discourage cartel and monopolistic business practices [ ... ], to encourage 
competition and productivity and to facilitate and stimulate the growth of 
international trade by reducing barriers which may hamper such trade [ . .. ]'04 
However, this was little more than rhetoric. This was the same country with an 
industrial law in force stating that "Spain must be redeemed from the importation of 
exotic products and must be forced to produce everything it needed" . IOS Foreign 
ownership of Spanish firms was still limited to 25 %, and the expropriations of the 
Barcelona Traction and the Rio Tinto Company highlight how little the situation 
improved during the 1950s. '06 Moreover, the government, if anything, intensified 
the establishment of national industries under INI.107 Crucially, the system of 
licenses through which any new industrial facility had to ask the bureaucracy for 
permission would not be repealed until 1960.108 
Most analyses stress the gradualism and slowness of reforms during the 1950s,'09 
and agree that by the end of the decade the Spanish was an economy still overloaded 
with distortions . IIO The lack of specific measures adopted suggests that the reform 
programme was little more than words and promises by certain cabinet members . If 
this is so the case, why did growth resume so vigorously? Why were promises 
enough to convince businessmen? 
104 Article IT, paragraph I, Economic Aid Agreement signed on 26th September 1953 . 
MAE, Leg.4615, Exp.1S . 
IOS Industrial Law of 24 October 1939. Carr and Fusi, Spain, p.SO. 
106 G6mez Mendoza, "The cost of Francoist economic policies" . 
1(17 Martin Aceiia and Comin, 1Nl. 50 anos. 
IOS Buesa, "Las restricciones", p. llO. 
109 Garcfa Delgado, "Crecimiento industrial", p.290, Prados and Sanz, "Growth", p.362. 
110 This was especially the view of contemporary foreign observers . See, for example, The 
Statist. International Banking Supplement, 13'" December 19S8, p.llS . 
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Spain is to receive an economic aid, which volume is not in our view the most 
important, but the influence that it could have on the normal development of 
our economy. 
Editorial of the fortnightly Economia, 30th September 1953 . 
4.3. The credibility hypothesis 
Despite the amount of American aid actually delivered is seen as relatively small, 
we suggest that American support was instrumental in enhancing the credibility of 
the government. It secured the Franco regime and also made it committed to 
stability (as we have seen with the anti-inflationary policies) and to furthering pro-
market reforms. The few changes that got through were signalling that more were 
on the way, and private investors anticipated that future moves were in the direction 
of a liberal market economy. In short, improved credibility was perhaps the main 
gain from American support. lll 
That businesses' expectations changed as early as the return of Ambassadors to 
Madrid in 1950 has been suggested elsewhere .ll2 Yet, in a world of rational 
individuals expectations do not change randomly . It would be an easy and 
unimaginative way to suggest that Spanish investors (perhaps due to the well-known 
hot bloodedness of Spaniards or any other culturally embedded explanation) were 
III A similar argument for Germany was put forward by Berger and RitscW, "Germany and 
the political economy" . 
112 Gonzalez, "La autarquia econ6mica" . This paper shares that concern with the role of 
expectations . However, Gonzalez, from a property rights paradigm, suggests that through 
deregulation and liberalisation property rights were better defmed in the 1950s and thus 
generated growth. It also suggests that American aid had the consequence of expanding the 
production possibilities frontier . However, it provides no evidence on any of the suggested 
hypotheses . Moreover, the property rights approach requires that policies and regulations 
actually changed. Our thesis is different in the sense that it suggests that the main impact of 
American aid came through changed expectations which were not primarily prompted by 
deregulation and liberalisation by the American support in itself. Fraile, "Industrial 
policy", points at the importance of expectations although does not provide any further 
discussion. 
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simply fooled by the promise of the American manah. We should thus provide a 
rational explanation to why investors modified their expectations precisely in the 
early 1950s. 
The remaining of this dissertation is devoted to elaborate a theoretical framework for 
this "credibility hypothesis" and, in the next section, to produce some evidence in 
support of it. 
In simple game theoryl13 terms we suggest an explanation for the effectiveness of 
American aid in enhancing the credibility of the government and making investment 
profitable. 
Let us suppose we have two players, the government on one hand and a group of 
investors on the other. Investors decide whether to invest or not (decided in t=O and 
a binding decision until the end of t= 1). Suppose that if investors do not invest, 
production (Y) equals 100 and if they invest (incurring a cost of 50) production in 
time t= 1 rises to 200. 
In a sequential game,114 the government then decides whether to carry out 
"confiscatory" policies (interpreted as a 100% tax rate -one can think also in terms 
of a confiscation of assets by a revolutionary government that replaced Franco) or, 
alternatively can leave investors without taxing them at all (interpreted as the 
continuity of the regime). The game is presented in its extensive form in figure 1 
below. 
113 Our analysis will be of a non-cooperative nature, as opposed to cooperative game theory 
in which it is assumed that the agreements reached between the players are binding. Were 
we to assume binding contracts we would precisely be interested in what makes those 
contracts binding. For this reason we restrict to non-cooperative game theory . For 
definitions and explanation of these issues see Kreps, Game Theory and Economic 
Modelling, p.9. 
114 The outcome of the game does not change if we assume simultaneous moves with no 
information on the other player's move. 
34 
Figure 1 
Game 1: investors and government without commitment technology 
(payoffs for investors first) 
CONFISCATE 
(-50 ,200) 
o 
INVESTORS 
INVEST 
o 
GOVT 
NO CONF . 
(150,0) 
NOT TO INVEST 
o 
GOVT 
CONF . NO CONF. 
(0,100) (100,0) 
As depicted above the government has a dominant strategy to "confiscate" because 
no matter what investors do, the government is better off by confiscating. Investors 
will realise this, and decide not to invest, which will leave them better off [0 cf. 
50]. The only Nash equilibrium is the pair of strategies "not invest" and 
"confiscate" . Announcements that the government will not confiscate will not be 
credible 11 5 under the above circumstances. 116 
Let us now suppose that the government will receive a grant of 201 if non-
confiscatory policies are followed. The tree is depicted in figure 2 below. 
liS To give a strategic move credibility the player has to take some other supporting action 
that makes reversing the move too costly or even impossible . Dixit and Nalebuff, Thinking 
Strategically, p.124. 
116 For a discussion of credibility and of ways to measure it see Bomer et al ., Political 
Credibility . 
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Figure 2 
Game 2: investors and government with commitment technology 
(Payoffs for investors first) 
CONFISCATE 
(-50,200) 
o 
INVESTORS 
INVEST 
o 
GOVT 
NO CONF . 
(150,201) 
NOT TO INVEST 
o 
GOVT 
CON~CONF . 
(0,10 0 ) (100 ,201) 
The government now has a different dominant strategy, namely not to confiscate. 
Note that the outcome of the game does not depend on ex post results but on ex ante 
perceptions of what the different policies will entail. In fact, it is not the actual but 
the expected payoff what drives decisions in this model, thus diluting somehow the 
strength of the criticism that the expected payoffs seem to be unfeasible to quantify . 
Admittedly, the parameters and layout of the game chosen are arbitrary . 
Furthermore, cooperation will be more likely if players possess complete 
information about the other player's past performance, when there are small 
numbers of players, or if the game is to be repeated an indefinitely number of times, 
as these might give rise to self-interested reasons to cooperate and thus possibly 
change the outcome of the game.117 
II7 AxeJrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, p.31. 
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Despite its crudeness, this way of modelling might be a useful guide in the search 
for explanations on how and when can foreign aid help a domestic government to 
gain credibility. Game theory has made a breakthrough in the analysis of 
institutions,118 and recent literature on postwar European growth has focused 
precisely on how countries were able to commit to openness. 119 The analysis 
presented above can help us understand, using Popper ' s sentence, the logic of the 
situation. 
Resolving commitment problems raises the predictability of the government and thus 
it encourages economic activity. 120 Any regime, and an authoritarian one perhaps 
even more, needs to resolve the paradox that a government strong enough to enforce 
property rights is also able to confiscate its citizens' wealth, and thus might 
discourage private economic activity.12I In the case of Franco's Spain this was 
achieved by bringing in a foreign power with the capacity, and the interest, to 
enforce stability in the country. The Pact of Madrid secured the Spanish government 
and, to a certain extent, tied its hands (for example to an anti-inflationary policy). 
By doing so, it raised the predictability of the policies and contributed to a positive 
business sentiment. 
5. Testing the credibility hypothesis 
This section presents evidence in support of the hypothesis that American aid had a 
significant impact on altering the expectations and sentiment of the business 
community. 
118 North, "Institutions", and especially Greif, "Recent developments". 
119 Eichengreen, "Institutions and Economic Growth" 
120 North and Weingast, "Constitutions and commitment" . 
121 See Weingast, "The Economic Role of Political Institutions" . 
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The first variable we are interested in looking at is investment, and, related to it, 
capital stock. Until very recently there were very few estimates of capital stock for 
the Spanish economy. 122 Recent research on this difficult task allows us to present an 
estimate of private net capital stock in graph 6 below. 123 
' 7 
,. 
13 
11 
Graph 6 
Private net stock of capital 
(in billion of 1990 pesetas) 
,O~ ____________________________________ ~ 
, ... 1iMa 1850 1952 1854 1850 1958 
Source: Cubel and Palafox. "The Capilal Stock". 
The data shows that private investment picks up in the early 1950s. 124 However, this 
does not imply that this spurt of growth in private investment was causally linked to 
the granting of American aid. In the absence of a comprehensive measure for 
"business confidence" that we could use in regression analyses, we will have to 
In Universidad Comercial de Deusto, Riqueza TU2cional de Espafia , and Cossio, "El factor 
capital" were the only post-war attempts. Carreras, "Gasto Nacional Bruto", provides 
estimates of investment to GDP ratios. All these sources combine public and private 
investment and capital. 
123 Both Cubel and Palafox "The Capital Stock" , and Hofman, "The capital stock", use 
perperual inventory methods to calculate the stock of capital, requiring thus certain 
assumptions on working lives, depreciations, etc . 
124 In order to test for a structural break an econometric model of investment was attempted . 
See appendix H. 
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make use of a variety of indicators to suggest that enhanced business sentiment did 
in fact play a key role . 
In a country with a floating exchange rate, we can interpret episodes of real 
appreciation of the domestic currency vis-a-vis relatively safer currencies as 
indicative of increased confidence in the management of the economy. Spain, 
however, had an extremely cumbersome mUltiple exchange rate regime, in which 
the peseta was fixed at different (and generally overvalued) rates according to the 
type of transaction and goods involved. The system was in itself a deterrent to 
undertake export-import businesses .12s Nevertheless, there certainly existed a black 
market for dollars in Spain, and, more importantly, there was a free market for 
foreign exchange in the North African city of Tangiers. We can then look at the 
reaction of the peseta curb market for signs of improved confidence in the future of 
the Spanish economy. 
The impact of the signing of the Pact of Madrid had a significant short-term effect. 
In September 1953 in Tangiers, the peseta was traded at 43.55 pesetas/dollar, 
dropping to 42.50 pesetas to a dollar in October. 126 Graph 7 below shows the 
evolution of the foreign exchange curb market on an annual basis . We interpret the 
appreciation of the peseta in the early years of the 1950s as a sign of resumed 
confidence. 
III PRO, FO 371179665, Spain: Annual Review for 1948, Mr Howard to Mr Bevin, 
Madrid, 9'" February 1949. 
126 Banco de Espaiia, Infonne sobre la evoluci6n de la economia espaiiola en 1957, p.137. 
Despite being an official source, it quotes the Tangiers exchange rate. 
39 
Graph 7 
The peseta unofficial market 
(pesetas per US dollar) 
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Sources: 
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EIU 
Tangiers 
"EIU" refers to Ihe curb market as reponed in The Economist Intelligence Unit, Economic 
Review of Spain, various issues. 
"Tangiers" refers to Ihe exchange rate in Ihe market of Tangiers as quoted in Clavera et al . , 
Capilalismo espaiio/, p.270. 
Similarly, one of the first places to look at when matters of business sentiment are 
discussed is the stock exchange. Given the volatility of the stock exchange, we focus 
on the period 1951-55 to try to capture the immediate impact of the announcements 
of American aid to Spain. Graph 8 below shows the monthly evolution of the stock 
exchange general index. 
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Graph 8 
Monthly real index of shares in Spanish stock exchange 
(markets of Madrid, Barcelona, and Bilbao) 
general index corrected by the wholesale price 
36 ,--------------------------------------, 
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1952 1953 1954 1955 
Source: Instituto NacionaI de Estadistica, Boletin Estadistico. Pub/icacion mensual, various issues . 
The change in the index around the signing of the Pact of Madrid is clear. The very 
short-term impact -not captured by these monthly indices- was probably spectacular. 
For contemporary observers there were no doubts that the signing of the treaties was 
the most determinant cause of the strong reaction of the stock exchange. l27 More 
important than the short-term reaction is the break in a longer-term downward trend, 
as suggested in graph 8 above. This shift form a bear to a bull market can be 
interpreted as a sign that investors were discounting future economic growth. 128 It 
was not only the stock exchange index that experienced a sustained rise . The 
turnover in the market for shares also went up significantly in the years after the 
deal with the Americans had been reached, as shown in graph 9 below. 
127 See the weekly Espafla Econ6mica, 10m October 1953, p.815 . 
128 Barski and De Long, "Bull and Bear Markets", p.269, suggests that even small changes 
in prospects for economic growth rates can justify large swings in the stock markets. 
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Graph 9 
Real trading volumes in shares in Spanish stock exchange 
(markets of Madrid, Barcelona, and Bilbao) 
in millions of 1942 pesetas 
800 .----------------------------------------, 
700 
6 00 
500 
400 
3 0 0
, 95, 1952 1953 1954 1955 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica. Boletfn Estadfscico. Publicacion mensual. various issues. 
Nominal volumes have been deflated using deflator BPGDPMP8 from Prados. Gross Domestic 
Product. See appendix G. 
Overall , both national and foreign analysts coincide in the positive impact on the 
stock exchange of the signing of the agreements. Significantly, the impact does not 
seem to have been a short-term one.129 
However, looking at the stock exchange only gives us a limited picture of the 
economy since it ignores firms whose shares are not traded in the market. Graph 10 
below presents the information available on the capital subscribed by all Spanish 
finns that were in business . 
129 Rogers, Economic and Commercial Conditions in Spain, 1956, p.80. 
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Graph 10 
Real capital disbursed by operating fInns 
in millions of 1940 pesetas 
30,000 r--------------- -----, 
28,000 
26,000 
24 ,000 
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18,000 
16,000 
14,000 
12,0001940 1942 1944 1946 1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 
1941 1943 1945 1947 1949 1951 1953 1955 1957 1959 
Source: Tafunell . "Asociaci6n mercantil" . Nominal figures have been deflated using deflator 
BPGDPMP8 from Prados. Gross Domestic Producr. See appendix D. 
Although the drop in 1950 and 1951 is puzzling, the graph shows a steady increase 
from then onwards, which could be interpreted as evidence that the business 
community was feeling confIdent and willing to raise new capital. 
Graphs 6 to 10 above show that private investors, the unofficial foreign exchange 
market, and the stock exchange, were all responding positively to the new situation 
in the early 1950s, and can be used to support the view that confIdence was in fact 
improving. There are other pieces of evidence that point in the same direction. 
The references to the unwillingness of the Spanish business community to undertake 
investment in the late 1940s and early 1950s are numerous . American sources refer 
clearly to "the reluctance of private capital to move into certain sectors of the 
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economy" yo For example, when in 1950 the Bilbao steel interests were invited to 
participate in the share capital of 1Nl's steel project ENS IDES A , they declined the 
offer. 131 Perhaps they did not feel comfortable dealing with a group such as the 1Nl, 
not concerned with profit maximisation but with Spanish industrial self-sufficiency. 
However, the Spanish private capital had no major problems in joining an 1Nl 
project like the refinery in Escombreras . It can hardly be seen as irrelevant that in 
this latter project the American company Caltex was one of the shareholders. 132 
Foreign firms examined the possibility of investing in Spain. In the autumn of 1952, 
the US Secretary of Commerce, the president of the Eximbank, and Henry Ford Ir. 
all visited Spain, the latter with the idea to explore the possibilities of resuming 
production in Spain.133 However, the participation of Caltex in the Escombreras 
refmery was something like an exception. Little foreign direct investment took 
place, mainly due to the persistence of Spanish authorities in not lifting the 
restrictions on foreign ownership of firms,134 and in fact some companies actually 
pulled off. 135 
However, the capacity of Americans to "signal " was probably very significant, 
especially in the case of large projects, such as the refmery that we have referred to . 
Our theoretical framework helps to explain these episodes particularly well . Large 
130 Report of Special Study Mission of Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of 
Representatives. December 1961. In MAE, Leg.7741 , Exp.2. The passage refers to the 
early 1950s. See also footnote 1 above for Culbertson's succint exposition. 
131 Clinton Pelharn, Economic and Commercial Conditions in Spain. 1951, p.4. 
132 Rogers, Economic and Commercial Conditions in Spain. 1956, p.64. REPESA, the 
company owning the refmery, was constituted on 27ft> June 1949 with 325 m ptas of which 
1Nl had 52%, CEPSA (owned by Banco Central) had 24% and Caltex Oil Products the 
remaining 24 %. On 11 June 1952 the owners of REPESA subscribed a further 150 m ptas 
of capital maintaining the proportions. Economia, 30ft> December 1954. 
133 Economist Intelligence Unit, Economic Review of Spain , no.4 Dec 1952. 
134 Although, surprisingly, the Economist Intelligence Unit reports of some companies with 
50% foreign ownership. Economic Review of Spain, no.5, April 1953, p.6. 
l3S Ford will fmally pull off in 1954, see Carreras and Estape, "Organizational 
complexity" . 
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industrial projects are the type of assets that are more prone to be nationalised in the 
event of a change of policies or of regime altogether. Moreover, large sunk costs 
will make it particularly important to enjoy relative price stability. A certain security 
that the government will last and that changes in policies would be, if anything, pro-
market reforms, are conceivably especially relevant for these type of projects . In our 
framework it is not surprising that, 
[a]t the end of 1953, and perhaps due to the agreements with the US, we have 
seen a new trend [ .. . ] to build new and important power-stations. 136 
6. Conclusion 
This dissertation has explored the hypothesis that American aid to the Spanish 
economy in the 1950s did have a significant impact in the resumption of growth 
through a positive effect on Spanish business sentiment. 
A prerequisite to test any hypothesis is to establish the precise amounts of aid 
disbursed. As it has been made clear above, a full account is not still available and 
further research in this area will be valuable . 
Some of the possible transmission mechanisms from American assistance to 
economic growth discussed in the literature were also reviewed. We conclude that 
the direct impact of aid in the Spanish economy through the relief of supply 
bottlenecks could not explain the economic growth recorded . Similarly, it has been 
contended that the argument that deregulation and liberalisation spurred growth 
cannot fully account for the Spanish experience in the 1950s, since not much was in 
fact liberalised. 
136 Banco Urquijo. La Economia espanola 1952-53. p.30 
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This dissertation provides a rationale for the "credibility hypothesis " , and then tests 
it with evidence such as observers' reports , stock exchange evolution, and aggregate 
figures of private investment. To underpin the causal link it will be necessary to 
undertake research on a micro business level, an area of Spanish economic history in 
its infancy . Still within the business history sub-discipline, a totally ignored aspect 
here relates to firms ' organizational aspects. Issues such as how did the presence of 
American contractors affect the technical skills of specialised workers and the way 
firms were organised would certainly be worth of srudy . 137 
Despite the game theoretical analysis can be criticised as simplistic, its explanatory 
power should not be underestimated . Our framework can help explain the timing of 
reforms, including the 1959 Stabilisation Plan. Following American support and 
resumed growth in the 1950s, Franco 's power was by the end of the decade much 
more strongly consolidated than in the 1940s. It can be argued that as the furure of 
the regime was secured, it moved away from short-term survival maximisation and , 
as an unchallenged autocracy, developed an interest in promoting long-term 
economic growth. 138 Although not explicitly considered here, this is one of the many 
ways in which we can relate the Spanish case to the issues discussed in the literarure 
on the political economy of reform and stabilisation packages . Recent contributions 
have provided formal models of the reasons why these programmes are delayed139 
and the circumstances under which foreign aid will foster the adoption of 
stabilisation programmes. 140 The lack of discussion of them should not be interpreted 
137 See the recent papers by Carreras and Tafunell, "Spanish Big Firms" , and Carreras and 
Estape, "Organizational complexity" . 
138 As in McGuire and Olson, "The Economics of Autocracy" . The problem with this view 
is that Franco's stance is very difficult to label under any category (benevolent dictator? , 
survival maximiser?, unchallenged autocrat with long-term concerns?). Throughout his life 
he kept an eclectic approach to economic policy , and he only unwillingly agreed on the 
1959 stabilisation package: "Do whatever you want" was his corrunent to the new 
suggestions by his new ministers . Hottinger, Spain in Transition , p.24. For an account of 
the "peculiar" approach to economics of Franco see Fontana, " Introducci6n" . 
139 Alesina and Drazen, "Why Are Stabilisations Delayed?" 
140 Casella and Eichengreen, "Can Foreign Aid Accelerate Stabilisation?" . 
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as a dismissal of their value. Game theory has also been successfully employed to 
justify the concept of development traps, which are seen as the "bad" or low level 
equilibrium in a game with multiple equilibria.141 Although our analysis can be seen 
as providing a rationale for a development trap (low investment due to lack of 
credibility/stability), in our explanation the trap does not arise because of the 
existence of multiple equilibria . Again, that avenue is worth exploring . 
More specifically, our discussion supports the view that the Spanish case can be 
seen as an example of both the counterfactual of the Marshall Plan and of the impact 
of American aid . 142 The Spanish experience in the 1940s can be thought of as what 
would have occurred throughout Europe had the Marshall Plan not been 
implemented, with state intervention dominating economic policy . 143 However, the 
1950s can be approximated to the experience of the recipients of Marshall aid. 
On broader terms, our study supports the view that openness leads to 
convergence, l44 but not only in the way it is usually emphasised (such as 
specialisation according to comparative advantage, economies of scale, or increased 
competition) but especially in the indirect way of enhancing stability and raising 
predictability of the government with the subsequent positive impact on businesses ' 
expectations . 
Overall, it seems plausible that expectations and confidence enhancement played a 
decisive role in the resumption of Spanish economic growth. The difficulties in 
quantifying and assigning precise relevance to the credibility hypothesis should do 
but motivate further research. 
141 Murphy, Schleifer, and Vishny , "Industrialization and the Big Push" . 
142 Prados and Sanz, "Growth" , p.363 . 
143 The view that this was the most significant contribution of the ERP can be found in 
Eichengreen and Uzan, "The Marshall Plan". 
144 As argued for Spain in Tortella, "Patterns of economic retardation". 
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7. Appendices 
Appendix A. Details of "defense support" aid as appropriated 
In current thousands US dollars . 
1953-54 1954-55 1955-56 1956-57 
Agric.products 15,000 55,000 27 ,000 18,500 
Cotton 15,000 49,000 20,000 -
Meat - - 5,000 -
Eggs - - 1,500 2,500 
Soy oil - 6,000 - l4,OOO 
Barley - - 2,000 
Soy flour - - - -
Raw materials 15,000 7,690 4,600 35,500 
Coal 1,225 3,190 1,700 7,965 
Copper 2,660 900 - 11,960 
Scrap metal 3,650 1,800 1,000 5,782 
Steel products 3,045 900 - 750 
Mise . 4,420 900 1,900 9,043 
Machinery 54,392 21,510 26,400 15,000 
RENFE 11,000 4,500 9,000 5,000 
Civi l aviation 768 900 886 500 
Public works 5,000 720 - -
Electricity 5,400 8,000 4,500 
ind. 12 , 196 2,340 - -
Defense ind . 3,428 - 626 -
Steel ind . 8,012 - 1,500 -
Cement ind . 2,282 - - -
Mining 1 ,9 54 - - -
Textile ind . - 3,330 5,000 5,000 
Agrarian 8 , 452 4,230 - -
equip. - 90 - -
Shippings 
Mise. 
Technical 
assistance 607 800 2,000 1,000 
TOTAL 85,000 85 ,000 60,000 70,000 
Source: Rovira, "La ayuda" , p.139. 
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1957-58 1958-59 
22,784 18,000 
15,784 15,150 
- -
- 1,280 
6,000 -
1,000 -
- 1,570 
27,366 23 , 619 
13,194 8,500 
4,500 3,900 
4,820 3,000 
1 ,859 5,000 
2,993 3,219 
4,850 8 , 381 
- 116 
39 539 
838 2,563 
999 708 
- -
- -
- -
717 207 
- -
2,007 3,6l4 
- 355 
2 50 279 
1,304 1,239 
56,304 51,239 
Appendix B. Foreign trade 
Exports Imports Exports Imports 
fob cif fob cif 
1935 964 . 1 1903.3 1953 894.1 1658.9 
1954 874.4 1619.4 
1948 628.1 1319 1955 876.2 1622.7 
1949 655.1 1313.2 1956 870.8 1612.9 
1950 847.4 1227.6 1957 878.9 1627.6 
1951 963 . 3 1197 .1 1958 904.8 1675.8 
1952 860.2 1501. 6 1959 1004 . 9 1861.2 
In million 1913 pesetas 
Source: Tena, "Comercio exterior". 
Imports 
cotton cotton cotton machinery Fertilizers 
,000 tons million million $ million $ Million $ 
ptas 
1935 101.4 92.9 30 . 3 109.9 25.3 
1947 57.2 122 . 8 40.1 109.2 16.9 
1948 65.2 159.8 52 . 2 146.1 18 . 8 
1949 72.9 167.3 54.6 161.2 22 . 7 
1950 56.7 130 42 . 5 125.4 38.5 
1951 51. 7 156.3 51.1 164 .1 29.2 
1952 82.2 250 81. 7 268.6 44.3 
1953 68 . 4 192 . 4 62.9 386.4 29.5 
1954 58.8 151 . 7 49 . 5 430.4 36.1 
1955 72 .4 204 . 9 66.9 427.2 44.8 
1956 45.8 132.8 43.4 557.7 53.7 
1957 56 . 8 137.9 45.1 553.3 51. 9 
1958 74.1 188.3 61. 5 450.3 63.5 
1959 72.9 165 . 6 54.1 406.9 76 . 4 
Source: United Nations, Yearbook of international trade statistics, various issues. 
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Appendix C. Private net capital stock 
In millions 1990 pesetas 
1940 11,728,088 
1941 11,599,086 
1942 11,502,035 
1943 11,367,829 
1944 11,159 , 8 4 9 
1945 11,022 , 120 
1946 11,051 , 912 
1947 11 , 116,100 
1948 11,237,126 
194 9 11,330,232 
195011,509,543 
195111,767,207 
195212,197,241 
1953 12,664 ,998 
195413,3 0 7,603 
1955 l4, 096,058 
195615,051,686 
1957 16,059,342 
195817,194,846 
Private capital stock is dermed as those durable , tangible, reproducible assets owned by the private sector 
of the economy and siruated in Spanish territory , regardless of the owner ' s nationaliry . 
Source: Cubel and Palafox, The Capital Stock. 
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Appendix D. Capital disbursed of operating companies 
(1) (2) (3) 
Capital deflator capital 
M ptas M 1940 ptas 
1940 14981 2.15 14981 
1941 17067 2.55 14389.82 
1942 19088 2.85 14399 .72 
1943 20799 2 . 99 14955.8 
1944 23091 3.40 14601.66 
1945 25455 3.62 15118 .3 
1946 32107 4.42 15617.66 
1947 4.88 
1948 41312 5.18 17146.87 
1949 46925 5.65 17856 . 42 
1950 52150 6.90 16249 . 64 
1951 62570 8 . 51 15807.93 
1952 72806 8.54 18329.38 
1953 82535 8.89 19960.66 
1954 94306 9.39 21592.96 
1955 108669 9.92 23552.25 
1956 123457 10 .6 6 24899.86 
1957 154892 12.03 27682.28 
1958 174848 13 . 41 28033 . 05 
1959 188318 14.33 28254.27 
(I) Capital disbursed by operating flrms in million pesetas . Tafunell , "Asociaci6n mercantil" . 
(2) Deflator BPGDPMP8, Prados, Gross Domestic Product. 
(3) Real capital disbursed in millions of 1940 pesetas . 
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Appendix E. Inflation 
RPI inflation 
1976=100 % 
1941 6.91 29 . 89 
1942 7.39 6.95 
1943 7.35 -0.54 
1944 7.65 4.08 
1945 8.21 7.32 
1946 10 .77 31 .18 
1947 12 .68 17.73 
1948 13 . 53 6 . 70 
1949 14 . 26 5.40 
1950 15.81 10 . 87 
1951 17.30 9 .42 
1952 16.96 -1. 97 
1953 17.23 1. 59 
1954 17.44 1. 22 
1955 18 . 14 4.01 
1956 19.21 5.90 
1957 21.25 10.62 
1958 24 . 13 13.55 
1959 25.89 7 . 29 
1960 26.19 1.16 
1961 26.64 1. 72 
1962 28 . 23 5 . 97 
1963 30 . 66 8.61 
1964 33 . 04 7.76 
1965 37.39 13 . 17 
1966 39 .75 6.31 
1967 42.32 6 .47 
1968 44.27 4 . 61 
1969 45.37 2 . 48 
1970 48 .2 9 6 . 44 
Source: own calculations with data from Maluquer. ·Precios" . In table 3 in the main text the standard 
deviation is also shown. This was calculated on these figures of inflation using the formula std dev = [[1:(xi-n-
11: xi)2] n-l] 'h. 
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Appendix F. Foreign exchange 
CUrb market 
dollar dollar sterling 
EIU Tangiers Tangiers 
1 949 45 
1950 51. 5 52.52 
1951 53 51. 27 126.7 
1952 48.5 48 . 54 140.1 
1953 43.4 43.3 124.35 
1954 42.98 123.5 
1955 43.16 123.45 
1956 45 . 19 130.42 
1957 53.95 155.80 
Dollar EIU : peseta/dollar exchange rate in the curb market, as reponed in The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, Economic Review of Spain, various issues . 
Dollar Tangiers: peseta/dollar exchange rate in the free market of Tangiers, as quoted in Clavera et 
al., Capiralismo espaiiol, p.270. 
Sterling Tangiers: peseta/sterling exchange rate in the free market of Tangiers, as quoted in 
Tarnarnes, Esrrucrura Economica de Espana, pp.542-3 
Index of effective real exchange rate (according to the trade balance), post-1959 
stabilisation = 100 
1948 232.5 
1949 208.1 
1950 172.7 
1951 125.7 
1952 121.7 
1953 136.9 
1954 131. 8 
1955 127.6 
1956 138 . 5 
1957 130.5 
1958 133.9 
Source: Serrano and Asensio, "El ingenierismo" , p.268. 
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Appendix G. Stock exchange 
Jan 
Feb 
Mar 
Apr 
May 
Jun 
Jul 
Aug 
Sep 
Oct 
Nov 
Dec 
Index of shares in Spanish stock exchange (Madrid, Barcelona, and Bilbao), 
corrected by wholesale prices . 
1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 
27.33 27.12 25 . 81 26.30 29.10 
28 . 45 27.83 25.89 26.22 29.79 
29.02 28.49 25.48 26.48 30.54 
27.51 28 .4 9 24.75 27.55 31. 23 
26.74 27.46 24.76 27.37 30.35 
23.27 28.17 24 .4 3 27.27 30.07 
26.98 27.43 23.96 27.40 30 . 68 
28 . 09 27.44 24.29 28.12 32.27 
27 . 82 27.60 24.28 28.21 33.35 
27 . 39 27.02 24 . 77 28.37 33.57 
27.03 26.88 25.50 28.37 33.93 
26.74 26.13 25.64 28.00 33.76 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Boletfn de Estadistica. Publicaci6n mensual, various issues . 
Volume of shares traded 
(1) (2) (3) 
1942 986.4 2.9 986.4 
1943 920 . 4 3.0 877.3 
1944 885 .6 3.4 742.3 
1945 780.0 3.6 614.1 
1946 1405 .2 4.4 906.1 
1947 1288 . 8 4.9 752.7 
1948 801. 6 5.2 441.0 
1949 656 .4 5.7 331.1 
1950 682.8 6.9 282 . 0 
1951 1114.8 8 . 5 373 .3 
1952 1207 . 2 8 . 5 402 . 9 
1953 1146 .0 8.9 367 . 4 
1954 1776 . 0 9.4 539.0 
1955 2601.6 9 . 9 747 .4 
1956 3170.4 10.7 847.6 
1957 2604.0 12 . 0 616.9 
1958 2694.0 13 .4 572.6 
(I) Volume traded in shares, in million pesetas. Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Boletfn de 
Estatiistica. Publicaci6n mensual, various issues. 
(2) BPGDPMP8 deflator, Prados, Gross Domestic Product. 
(3) Volume traded in shares, in million 1942 pesetas . 
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Appendix H. Econometric modelling of investment 
In this section we attempt to model an investment function for the Spanish economy 
in the years 1940-1970. 
The model 
The model is the standard neoclassical one. 145 It assumes that firms will invest until 
they reach a certain stock of capital, K', such that the value of the marginal product 
of capital (VMPK= Py MPK) equals the cost of an extra unit of capital (user cost of 
capital, cuc) . The marginal product of capital (MPK) is assumed to be obtained from 
a Cobb-Douglas production funciton, 
(eq.l) Y = N (J-K) KK 
Where Y is output or income, N is labour force, K is capital, and K is the share of 
capital in the distribution of income (a property of the Cobb-Douglas function). We 
now obtain the MPK by differentiating in eq .1, 
(eq.2) MPK = 8Y/8K = N(J-K) KK (K-I) = K Y /K 
Since K' is the level at which Py MPK = cue, we obtain by substituting in (eq .2), 
(eq.3) K' = K Y Py Icuc 
The neoclassical model of the flexible accelerator can be summarised in the 
following equations, 
(eq.4) Net I == K. - Kt_I 
145 See Jorgenson, "Econometric Studies of Investment Behaviour". 
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(eq.5) Kt = K..l + L (K'- Kt-!) 
(eq.6) Net I, = L (K'- K,.l) 
This represents that firms will invest in time period t only a proportion of the gap 
between the actual and desired stocks of capital. By substituting (eq.3) into (eq.6), 
(eq.7) Net I, = L [(K Y Py Icuc)- K,.d 
Which can be regressed as follows , 
(eq.8) NETI, = So + SI Xl' + S2 X2, + U, , where 
NETI, = It - d*K..1 
XII = K Y, Py, Icuc = K Y, Py, I(r+d) 
X2, = K,.l, 
And d stands for depreciation, r for real interest rate. 
Data 
This model requires us to collect data on the following variables: 
K = share of capital in national income. Data was obtained from Maluquer, 
"Precios, salarios y beneficios". However, data for the pre-1954 period is not 
available, and the assumption that the average figure for1954-57 prevailed for the 
pre-1954 period was made . 
Y, = national income or GDP. We use data on real GDP for mining, manufacturing 
and industry, BVPIND8, by Prados, Gross Domestic Product. 
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Pyt = price level. We use the deflator BPPIND8 for industry , by Prados, Gross 
Domestic Product. 
r = real interest rate. Due to lack of alternative measures, the nominal interest rate 
used was the Bank of Spain discount rate, as quoted in Martin Acefia, "El sistema 
fmanciero ". To calculate the real interest rate we use an inflation rate based on 
deflator BPGDPM8 from Prados, Gross Domestic Product. 
d = depreciation of physical capital stock. We use the estimate on depreciation 
provided in Hofrnan, "The capital stock", series on capital stock in machinery and 
equipment. 
K = series of physical capital stock. We use Hofrnan, "The capital stock", series on 
capital stock in machinery and equipment. 
Net! = net investment. We use Hofrnan, "The capital stock", series on capital stock 
in machinery and equipment. 
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The table below provides the figures used . 
Yt Pyt gamma nominal r inflation 
1939 227.3 .37 ~ .i...QQ.i 16 . 45\ 
1940 252.7 3.92 ~ .i...QQ.i 21 . 47t 
1941 249.4 4.7 ~ .i...QQ.i 18 . 60\ 
1942 271 . 2 5.04 ~ 4.00\ 11 . 76% 
1943 262.1 5 . 33 ~ 4.00\ 4 .91\ 
1944 288.7 5.94 ~ 4.0 0\ 13 .71\ 
1945 271. 2 6 . 83 ~ 4 .00 \ 6.47\ 
1946 307 .5 7.57 ~ 4. 00\ 22.10\ 
1947 306 8.71 ~ 4.50\ 10 . 41\ 
1948 301. 2 9. 69 ~ 4.50\ 6.15\ 
1949 291. 9 10 .67 ~ 4.00\ .07\ 
1950 320.4 13 .38 ~ 4.00\ 22 .12\ 
1951 343 .4 18 .92 ~ 4 .00 \ 23 .33\ 
1952 401 19 .0 5 ~ 4 .00 \ 0 . 35\ 
1953 410 . 8 20.64 ~ 4.00\ .10% 
1954 436 . 6 21. 87 0.499 3.75\ 5 .62\ 
1955 469 23.1 0 . 496 3 .75\ 5.64\ 
1956 513 . 1 24.28 0 . 495 4 .25\ 7.46\ 
1957 544 . 9 26 . 9 0 . 497 5 .00 \ 12 .85\ 
1958 590.1 28.98 0 . 501 5 .00 \ 11 . 47\ 
1 959 600 . 5 29.29 0 .485 6.25% 6.86% 
1960 625 . 1 29.11 0. 47 5 . 75\ 0 .77\ 
1961 715 . 1 29 . 94 0.476 5 .00 % 1.73% 
1962 792.6 30.75 0.478 5 .00 \ 5.45\ 
1963 89 0. 4 32.08 0. 4 65 5 .00% 9.17% 
1964 1011.1 33 .28 0 .4 68 5.00\ 5.38\ 
1965 1155 .5 34.8 0. 462 5 .00% 9.93% 
1966 1282.9 35 . 38 0 . 444 5 . 00 % 7.81\ 
1967 1381 35 . 61 0 . 429 5 . 63% 5.92\ 
1968 1504.2 36 . 15 0.437 5 . 63\ 4.47\ 
1969 1759.4 35.87 0.429 6 . 88\ 3 . 94\ 
1970 1936.7 36 . 37 0.418 8 . 13\ 6 . 0H 
1971 2104.7 37.4 0.411 6 . 25\ 7 . 84\ 
1972 2457.3 38 . 47 0.394 6.25 % 8.79\ 
1973 2741.7 42 . 33 0.387 7.50\ 12 . 12\ 
1974 3047.5 48 . 19 0.391 8 . 75\ 15.56\ 
1975 3203 . 8 52.81 0.37 8 . 75\ 14 . 82\ 
1976 34 73.2 59 . 04 0. 355 8.75\ 15 . 73\ 
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1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
d d as \ of 
K 
125 0 . 06929 047 
115 0.06804734 
110 0.06836544 
104 0.06828628 
99 0.06937631 
92 0.07071483 
82 0.07044674 
73 0 . 06746765 
71 . 0.06717124 
70 '0.06578947 
72 0.066605 
72 0 . 06581353 
73 0.06218058 
83 0.06203288 
95 0.06213211 
109 0 . 06326175 
121 0.0646713 
128 0.06412826 
138 0 . 06415621 
149 0.06405847 
161 0.06416899 
173 0.06353287 
190 0.06339673 
210 0.06311993 
234 0.06332882 
259 0 . .06321699 
287 0.06267744 
323 0 .06263331 
364 0 . 06331536 
402 0.06380952 
438 0.0633864 
483 0.06343578 
532 0.0640578 
576 0.06378031 
629 0.06350328 
692 0 . 06331199 
765 0 . 06394183 
ud 
0.2338 
0 .2827 
0 . 2544 
0.1859 
0.1185 
0.2078 
0.1352 
0.2885 
0.1712 
0 . 1273 
0.1573 
0.2871 
0.2955 
0.0656 
0.1031 
0.1195 
.1211 
.1387 
.1927 
0.1788 
0.1328 
0.0712 
0.0807 
0.1116 
0.1550 
0.1170 
0.1620 
0.1407 
0.1225 
0.1085 
0.1028 
0.1235 
0 . 1425 
0.1516 
0.1847 
0.2189 
0.2121 
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Net! 
-125 
- 22 
-30 
-15 
-4 
-10 
-2 
27 
31 
49 
56 
61 
72 
100 
103 
81 
80 
93 
120 
129 
103 
150 
215 
249 
263 
295 
384 
440 
383 
335 
434 ' 
442 
348 
475 
606 
667 
531 
K Xl 
1804 -6912.7628 
1690 -4625.8619 
1609 - 7514.645 
1523 -72717.25 
1427 11546.2576 
1301 -32337 . 92 
1164 20166.7294 
1082 -10211.084 
1057 163887 . 58 
1064 29473.8789 
1081 97726 . 5333 
1094 -18495.946 
1174 -24670.239 
1338 38618.8082 
1529 69053 .1 7 
1723 107026.118 
1871 117511.856 
1996 192521. 333 
2151 -507250.09 
2326 -13085427 
2509 146916.682 
2723 75447.0918 
2997 106065.895 
3327 198598 . 878 
3695 613308.035 
4097 265104.6 
4579 1391497.85 
5157 583591.326 
5749 349117.906 
6300 315126.43 
6910 291684.369 
7614 347907.731 
8305 672446.109 
9031 969544.445 
9905 2588487.23 
10930 -12005570 
11964 19227465.3 
Estimation 
We estimated the model through OLS . 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
Dependent variable is NETINV 
36 observations used for estimation from 194 0 to 1975 
Regressor 
CONSTANT 
Xl 
KSTOCK(-l) 
Coefficient 
-20.2191 
.1349E-6 
.064058 
R-Squared .86746 
S. E. of Regression 73.8400 
Mean o f Dependent Variable 201.0833 
Residual Sum of Squares 179927 . 2 
Akaike Info. Criterion -207 .38 40 
DW-statistic . 60993 
Standard Error 
19.8704 
.3 119E-6 
.0047269 
T-Ratio [ProbJ 
-1. 0176 [. 3l6J 
.43255[.668J 
13.5516 [. OOOJ 
R-Bar-Squared .85943 
F-stat. F( 2, 33) 107.9890[ . 000J 
S.O. of Dependent Variable 
Equation Log-likelihood 
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
196.9418 
-204.3840 
-209.7 593 
The value of the Durbin-Watson statistic indicates that there is a strong possiblity of 
an auto-regressive process AR(l). This was confirmed by the plot of fitted and 
actual values, which showed residuals not being stochastic but following waves. We 
thus assume autocorrelation and proceed to estimate the model through the 
Cochrane-Orcutt method. 
Cochrane-Orcutt Method AR (l) converged after 5 iterat ions 
Dependent variable is NETINV 
36 observations used for estimation from 1 940 to 1975 
Regressor 
CONSTANT 
Xl 
KSTOCK (- l) 
Coefficient 
37.3556 
. 1071E-6 
.050589 
R-Squared .93263 
S. E. of Regression 53.2836 
Mean of Dependent Variable 201.0833 
Residual Sum o f Squares 88013.5 
Akaike Info. Criterion -190.6861 
DW-statistic 1. 6820 
Standard Error 
65.5079 
.1651E-6 
.012474 
T-Ratio[ProbJ 
.57 025 [. 572J 
. 64879[.521J 
4.0557[.000J 
R-Bar-Squared . 92610 
F-stat . F ( 3, 3lJ 143.0373 [.OOOJ 
S.D. of Dependent Variable 196.9418 
Equation Log - likelihood -186.6861 
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion -193.8531 
Parameters of the Autoregressive Error Specification 
Uz . 73464*U(-1)+E 
( 4.9281) [ .OOOJ 
T-ratio {s} based on asymptotic s tandard errors in brackets 
All we can safely conclude is that the data is not good enough to allow us to 
undertake this type of modelling, in which so many variables are combined into Xl. 
The coefficient on Xl fails to be significant and this would imply that net investment 
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is only explained by the previous level of capital stock. Lack of data on many 
variables, and the availability of only annual data make the exercise of little use . For 
these reasons no attempt at formalising a structural break test was made. However, 
if only to highlight the differences between in investment behaviour before and after 
the treaties with the Americans we have split the sample in 1940-1953 and 1954-
1975 (see below). 
The model seems particularly ill-suited to explain the pre-Pact of Madrid 
investment. Not even the lagged capital stock turns out to be significant. Although 
these results cannot be interpreted to support any thesis, they might suggest that 
investors' behaviour responded differently in the two periods. 
Cochrane-Orcutt Method AR(l) converged after 24 iterations 
Dependent variable is NETINV 
14 observations used for estimation from 1940 to 1953 
•••••••• •••••••••• * __ • __ ._ •••••• _ ••• ____ • ____ • ____ •• __ •• __ .w ••• w._w_.,. __ . ___ _ 
Regressor 
CONSTANT 
Xl 
KSTOCK(-l) 
Coefficient 
-93 . 6886 
-.2082E-6 
- . 011406 
R-Squared .93716 
S. E. of Regression 12.7353 
Mean of Dependent Variable 29.7143 
Residual Sum of Squares 1459.7 
Akaike Info. Criterion -53.1329 
DW-statistic 2.4511 
Standard Error 
988.3393 
. 1125E- 4 
.14601 
T-Ratio [ProbJ 
- .094794 [.926J 
-.018508 [ . 986J 
-.078117[.939J 
R-Bar-Squared .91621 
F-stat. F( 3 , 9) 44.7407[.000J 
S.D . of Dependent Variable 44.8149 
Equation Log-likelihood -49 . 1329 
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion -54.4110 
• _______ • ___ * _______ • __ • ______ • ____ ._. __ • __ ••• ________ tW_.tW •• _W_t_. _______ • __ 
Parameters of the Autoregressive Error Specification 
U= 1.0694*U( - 1)+E 
( *NONE*) 
.--WARNING--- The above autoregressive process is unstable! 
T-ratio(s) are not calculated . 
••••• *.**.*********.*.*****.************ •• ******* .* ********************** •• *** 
Cochrane-Orcutt Method AR(l) converged after 4 iterations 
******* •• *********************.*************** •• ****************************** 
Dependent variable is NETINV 
22 observations used for estimation from 1954 to 1975 
*******.*** •• *.* •••• *.*****.******.*****.******.***.*****************.******** 
Regressor 
CONSTANT 
Xl 
KSTOCK(- l ) 
Coefficient 
79.1447 
.1330E-6 
.048486 
Standard Error 
66.6824 
.2332E-6 
.011234 
T-Ratio [ProbJ 
1.1869 [.250J 
.57036 [. 575J 
4.3161 [.OOOJ 
****.************************************************************************* 
R-Squared .87539 
S .E. of Regression 66.5164 
Mean of Dependent Variable 310.1364 
Residual Sum of Squares 75215.3 
Akaike Info. Criterion -119 .7254 
DW-statistic 1. 6539 
R-Bar-$quared .8534 0 
F-stat. F( 3, 17) 39.8097[ .000J 
S.D. of Dependent Variable 177.0962 
Equation Log-likelihood -115.7254 
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion -121.9075 
***************.****.**.*.*.************************************************** 
Parameters of the Autoregressive Error Specification 
*************.**.************************************************************* 
U= .50313*U(-1)+E 
( 2.0370) [.057J 
T-ratio(s) based on asymptotic standard errors in brackets 
**.** •• *.**********.*.* •• ** •••• *.**.*****.************************************ 
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